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Introduction
 
 This paper surveys the wreckage of  modern monetary theory and policy which follow  from the 
disappearance of the modern quantity theory of money, and its empirical counterpart, the modern stock of fiat 
money.2 In order of significance, the consequences are (1) the disappearance of any optimum money supply policies, 
(2) vanishing internally consistent costs of inflation and (3) the theoretical revitalization of Keynesian economics 
stemming from recognition that the common impression Keynes was guilty of theoretical error is not correcting 
economies where ‘money’ plays a real role. 
 
Hamlet without the Prince.
 
 Economists used to argue Central Bank policy was concerned with changes in the stock of fiat (costless to 
produce) high-powered  money, H,  in the form of notes C and, far more importantly, reserves held by banks with 
Central Banks, R. These reserves, R, were the focal point of modern theory and policy. A money multiplier link was 
constructed between H, the state’s high powered money and M, the public’s money C + D, where D is bank 
deposits, so that where M is C +  D,  H = C + R, there existed a money multiplier such as M/H = [C + D]/[C + R] = 
[c + 1}/[c + r}, where c(...i, PG, ...) = C/D, the ratio of circulating cash to deposits held by private agents, a function 
of the opportunity cost of holding notes relative to other kinds of income bearing assets, including bank deposits, 
and nominal income of the community at large and r(.., i, PG,..) = R/D, the ratio of reserves to deposits held by 
banks, a function of the same variables. Central Banks, assuming that c(..i, PQ,...) and r(..i, PQ,...) were predictable 
relations, could costlessly change R (and H) to determine M with all the usual consequences.[Friedman, (1960)] A 
few monetary economists, for example Goodhart (1995), pointed out how obsolete from the viewpoint of actual 
Central Bank practice much of such discussion was, with little effect] If full employment equilibrium prevails, then 
changes in H would result in proportionate changes in P, the general level of prices with Q, the general level of 
output remaining unchanged. This is the neutrality proposition of the quantity theory of money. It would seem that 
H was an uninteresting constitutional monarch.  
 
 Full employment equilibrium was assured, however,  by the fact if not so money wage rates and P would 
fall until the community would redeposit unwanted stocks of C, not spent on consumption goods, with the banks 
which they in turn would redeposit with Central Banks so that R would tend to remain unchanged during a fall in P, 
so growing in real terms as P gets lower. Eventually, it was argued, interest rates would fall and bring about an 
increase in investment and Q and employment {the so-called Keynes effect} while if interest rates did not fall or had 
no effect on investment, the values of bank loans and deposits would crumble along with other nominal values {the 
so-called Fisher debt-deflation effect} apparently defeating the equilibration properties of a fall in, or falling, prices. 
However,  the real value of bank wealth would eventually rise as the real value of their monetary assets, R, rose 
which would bring about an increase in consumption until full employment equilibrium was restored {the so-called, 
pace Kalecki, Pigou - Patinkin - Friedman  ‘real balance’ effects} 
 
 The stock of H then not only played a role in determining P,  it also ensured that P was the full employment 
equilibrium level of prices. If P should ‘move fast’ enough in an equilibration way, the P is always as well the full 
employment set of money wages and prices.  Thus, H was both a constitutional and real monarch of the monetary 
stage. It would seem though that, if c(...) = 0, then M/H equals 1/r(...) so that it is really R which matters and we may 
ignore C . However, if as well r(...) = 0,  the money multiplier, the stock of money , M and the general level of 
prices P, are indeterminate! If R as well as C have departed  the stage, serious theoretical consequences follow.  
 
 A Brief History of the Disappearance of R.
 
 With Keynes’s foresight set out in a scattered away throughout his two volume TREATISE ON MONEY  
that reserve ratios were unnecessary for monetary policy [Rymes, (1998)] and a deeper understanding of the logic 
behind the  infamous  ‘2 for 1'  rule [Baltensberger, (1980 )] initially embraced by the Bank of Canada, then 
corrected and set out by the Bank [(1991, 1996)], [Clinton 1997]  see also Galbraith and Rymes, (1990)], it is now 
understood that central bank policy can be and now is conducted without reserves. Reserves for monetary policy 
purposes are an oxymoron. The Bank of Canada, a ‘representative ‘ Central Bank, does not operate on R, nor on r, 
for monetary policy purposes, it does not conduct open market operations to change bank reserves, nor does it use its 
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redeposit and drawdown mechanisms,  except for unusual technical reasons, to alter the  levels of bank settlement 
balances.  
 
  R is zero  
 
 Reserves in the form of positive deposits of the banks with the Bank have vanished.3
 
 Little in monetary policy has changed in fact from the case where banks were required to hold cash 
reserves, a fact which indicates clearly and dramatically their unimportance! The Bank runs monetary policy by 
movements in a band,  a difference between the rate it would charge on negative settlement balances of banks or 
direct clearers with it which is 25 basis points above the short term money market rate, i, and the rate it pays on 
positive settlement balances of banks,  25 basis points less than i, so that the current band or spread in Canada is 
now 50 basis points. The level (and spread?) of the band is set to determine i, what the Bank calls the overnight rate 
or its one sole target instrument of monetary policy.[Longworth, (2004)]  
 
  Consider a bank in a balanced portfolio equilibrium considering whether of not it should lessen its 
liquidity position by extending its short term or money market loans by accommodating dealers who take up their 
line of credit. If it does, then it earns i, the overnight rate. Ceteris paribus, however, it will experience stochastically 
a  corresponding increase in its negative settlement balances or a decease in its positive settlement balances with the 
Bank. An increase in its loans nets i %, whereas, assuming normality,  50% of the time it will  experience an 
increase in its negative settlement balances with the Bank, potentially paying a rate on its negative settlement 
balance of [i + ½]% and 50% of the time it will be losing positive settlement balances , losing at a rate of [i - ½]%. It 
expects to gain i, whereas it expects to lose 1./2 [i +25] and 1/2[i - 25] so that,  the sum of its expected gains and 
losses equalling zero,  the bank remains in equilibrium, with its portfolio remaining unchanged4. Similar reasoning 
applies to the possible decrease, calling of, in the bank’s loans and advances. 
 
    Should the overnight or money market rate seem to go higher, the bank would seek relatively to expand 
its loans and contract its deposits, being content, that is, with seeing a rise in its net negative settlement balances 
with the Bank until either the band is raised or until, all banks ‘following’, money market rates fall back to i. The 
crucial property to note is that though one bank seeks to alter its net position with the Bank, all banks cannot. To the 
extent one bank’s portfolio policy entails a negative sbs with the Bank, some other bank or banks must experience 
offsetting positive sbs. Once the Bank has set the overall sbs position for the banking system, there is nothing, repeat 
nothing,  banks together can do to alter that position. If the Bank wants the money market rate to rise, it simply 
raises the band by the amount it desires. If there exists a banking equilibrium such that deposits and loans or 
overdrafts are rising at some rate as are all nominal values, the overall reserve position of the banks remains zero. 
The system would then be characterized by an unknown level of nominal indeterminacy until the Central does 
something to resolve such indeterminancy. 
       
Modern Bank Policy 
 
 If one argues along Wicksellian and traditional quantity theory lines  there exists,  independently of the 
Bank, a real money market rate, i|, equal to the nominal rate, i, less any expected rate of inflation, p*, in the price of 
a pure bundle of consumption goods, P, then if p* = 0, we would say that the nominal  rate, i, = the real rate, i|. If the 
Bank is committed to ‘zero’ inflation and it believes that p* = k, k > or < 0, then it would raise (lower) the band by k 
as it would be expected to do so that the banks, acting on the basis of theoretically sound expectations,  would 
attempt to decrease (increase) loans and overdrafts and deposits so that i plus (minus) twenty five basis points would 
in fact keep loans and overdrafts and deposits unchanged in real terms.  If the Bank were wholly successful, then the 
overnight or money market rates would remain  unchanged and the actual rate of inflation, p, would remain  
unchanged.. Since the Bank can  be assumed to act successfully and would be known to so act successfully, any  
movement in the bands would be obviated. That is,  the basic argument behind Bank policy must be success. If it is 
successful in creating in the expectations of the community a state of beliefs such that, confidently,  p* = 0,  and it is 
assumed  the Bank has no effect on i|,  then, it must be the case that i is i| and can only vary as i| varies.  
 
 If the Bank holds the underlying theory that it cannot effect i| but can effect p* and therefore i, we will find 
that p* must always equal zero, and therefore that any change in i is real. If so, the banks will always and 
immediately bring about that level of i such that  p* = 0  is always maintained.  
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 It will be observed that p* = 0, and p = 0 are enforced by operations on the bands and not on any stock of 
reserves held by the banks. Indeed, as we have seen, in bringing about p = 0 and p* = 0, no operation on R is 
necessary. We will deal with this more fully later but let us see what can be jettisoned from new classical monetary 
economics and policies associated with it, to carry forward,  so to speak, Keynes’s task which he set himself in 
writing the GENERAL THEORY. 
 
Consequence #1: The Disappearance of Optimum Quantity of Money Supply Policies
 
 One of the casualties of the disappearance of the costless fiat money stocks is Friedman’s so-called 
optimum money supply policy. The problem which Friedman, following Wicksell, addressed was, since the real 
marginal social cost of an increase in the real stock of fiat money was zero, arranged by bringing about a lower price 
level, P, then there should exist a policy such that the marginal product of the services of such money balances had to 
be zero as well.5 Could a policy be found which would cause there to be costlessly a lower price level so that stocks 
of fiat money balances would be higher and their marginal products lower, enhancing social welfare. Friedman’s 
argument that there does exist an optimal money supply policy is considered by Woodford (1990, 1068) as  
 
  “...probably the most celebrated proposition in what one might call “pure” 
monetary theory...” 
 
 Consider the net marginal physical product of real fiat money balances. It would be such that i|, the real rate 
of return, would equal the net marginal physical product of real reserves in  the (say)  production of consumption 
goods.  
 
             We would have i| = dc/dH/P(..., H/P, K,..) - d- p*, where dc/dH/P is the gross marginal physical product in 
terms of consumption goods of real reserves, d is the marginal cost of producing such service flows such as anti- 
counterfeiting, which might be called the service price associated with the use  of reserves, and p* is the expected 
rate of change in the price of such consumption goods.  The stocks of K and dH/P must move to bring the system 
into equilibrium.  
 
 Now, if there is zero inflation, p = 0, and expectations match, p* = 0,  then the net marginal physical product 
of the services of real reserve balances would be equal to i|, the general real net rate of return, assumed here to be 
competitively determined in a steady state, equal to n + n’ + rho, the real rate of growth of the labour force and, if 
balanced, the population, plus n’ the rate of advance of Harrod neutral technical change plus rho,  the overall rate of 
time preference. If p and p* are zero, then the net marginal product of the fiat money balance would be positive. One 
wants it to be zero. Friedman’s brilliant solution was for the Bank to so run monetary policy such that the rate of 
change of prices would not only be p = 0, zero inflation, but should be such that p<0. If there exists a steady 
deflation, p = p*<0 , then it follows that i|H/P, the real rate of return on real fiat money balances would be initially 
increased by the expectation of a real capital gain from holding R/P. Individuals would want to hold more money. 
The Bank, however, controls the nominal money supply 6and keeps its rate of growth unchanged so that the general 
level of prices would be  falling, the real net rate of return on holding money is higher since a real capital gain can be 
acquired by holding money and the behaviour of the community will cause the excess demand for money to generate 
the required once-over reduction in the price level.  The fall in P is associated with R/P being larger, the gross 
marginal physical product of fiat money balances being lower until  the net product is zero, and an optimal money 
supply policy exists. That optimum money supply is to set, p* = p <0 equal to - i| so that the nominal or money rate 
of interest would be zero. 
  
 Another version of the Friedman argument would be to simply pay the going rate of interest on reserves and 
the consequences would be the same. It would appear that the paying of interest on reserves is much simpler than the 
policy of reducing the rate of growth of reserves. However, it would mean that some other method of insuring the 
going real rate of return on  Bank notes would have to be arranged. Goodhart has suggested a lottery on bank note 
serial numbers, generating the (expected) required rate of return on them if one cannot pay interest on such notes 
would do the trick. This leaves coins unattended but the whole point of the analysis of this paper, is to set aside notes 
and coin by putting their supply in private hands and to concentrate solely on reserves. 
 
  The Friedman optimum money supply policy is founded on the existence of an optimum stock of 
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reserves. Yet as we have seen such reserves have vanished. So Friedman’s optimum money supply policy has 
also vanished, an academic play whose major actor, the reserves, was at one time front and centre in monetary 
economics. 
 
Consequence #2: The Disappearance of The Costs of Internally Consistent Inflation
 
 Modern Banks, when they embrace the neutrality proposition of the quantity theory of money argue that 
there is nothing they can do to affect the long run rate of growth of output, real rates of interest and rates of 
unemployment, can always fall back on the argument that they are entrusted with maintaining the real value of the 
currency. The real value of the currency is $1/P, its nominal value divided by the price level. Each nominal unit of $H 
will remain unchanged if p = 0 and people’s trust in it will be maintained if p* = 0.(I set aside any failure of   Banks to 
maintain the nominal value of the stock of fiat money.) In order to convince the public of the importance of this 
traditional responsibility, one of the things Banks do is to show us the great costs of inflation. In the discussion of our 
first monetary casualty, we fell back on the simplest of pure economic monetary therein much of the discussion of the 
costs of inflation, all too often reference is made to economic monetary theory of a less fundamental nature. There do 
remain, however, theoretical measures of the costs of inflation based upon the fundamental theory of costless fiat 
money which generate some of the greatest estimates of the costs of inflation. 
 
  Any once-over change in nominal R is associated with a proportional once-over changes in the overall price 
level but nothing real happens. When the Bank change the nominal rate of interest paid on fiat money balances, or 
what amounts to the same thing, operate on the rate of growth of nominal reserves such that the expected, equal to the 
actual, steady rate of change of prices is affected, then real effects, it is argued,  do occur. One distinguishes between 
the classical neutrality of once-over changes in the nominal stock of money and the supernonneutrality of differences 
in the real interest rate the Bank pays on money balances or differences in the constant rate of growth of the money 
supply it arranges. A higher i| paid on R (or a lower p) will lead agents to want to hold more real money balances than 
is  determined by the Bank. The excess demand for money balances and the excess supply of goods will see a 
sequence of  once-over lower levels of prices, greater real money balances, lower marginal physical product of the 
services of money balances and higher marginal physical product of the services of capital, [waiving all Cambridge 
Capital Controversies aside in this paper], until temporary equilibrium  portfolio equilibrium holds. Rates of return are 
higher than their steady state levels and a process of accumulation of real capital and real money balances, the former 
by real costly savings, the latter by a sequence of steadily lower prices will occur until a new steady state is reached. 
Friedman's important result in 1969 was to uncover that monetary policy such that the fiat money arrangements would 
be a social optimum. Since increases in real money balances are costless from society's point of view, the appropriate 
real rate of interest the Bank should pay on fiat money balances held would be i|, the steady state rate of return. In that 
case, the price level would be such that the gross marginal physical product of real money balances would be equal to 
its carrying cost or service charge, equal to the marginal costs of maintaining the services of money such as 
enforcement against counterfeiting, so that from society's point of view the net marginal physical product of the 
services of real fiat money balances would be zero. The Bank is able, even in the world of the quantity theory, to 
determine at least one real rate of interest, that on its fiat money, through access to the lumpsum money tax 
mechanism, said to exist.7  
 
 Some writers [Laidler, (1990) and a critique, Milbourne, 1988)] claim that changes in the nominal money 
supply will have 'real' effects, if only temporarily.  For some reason(s), prices, i.e., all nominal magnitudes, are 'sticky' 
or people are confused between absolute and relative price movements.  Even a foreseen increase in the nominal 
money supply is, for some reason, not immediately obviated in real terms.  In some short run, a change in the nominal 
money supply has 'real' effects and the traditional quantity theory neutrality proposition does not hold.  Later, if not 
sooner, however, the real change said to be generated by the one-on change in the nominal supply will disappear and 
classical neutrality will be reaffirmed. 
 
  As Professor Alan Blinder (1994) says:  
 
"Any theory of how nominal money affects the real economy must face up to the following 
conundrum: Demand or supply functions derived -- whether precisely or heuristically -- from basic 
micro principles have money, M, as an argument only in ratio to P, the general price level.  Hence, if 
monetary policy is to have real effects, there must be some reason why changes in M are not followed 
promptly by equiproportionate changes in P.  This is the sense in which it is argued that some kind of 
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"price stickiness" is essential to virtually any story of how monetary policy works". 
 
 It  follows that expansions in R will lower real interest rates, raise rates of growth of output and lower rates 
of unemployment, however only for a short period of time. The outcome of once over changes in R, the nominal stock 
of fiat money will result, however, in the long run nothing real but just higher Ps. Continued applications of more R 
will result in higher Ps but higher ps. (Indeed, the higher ps will cause the higher Ps to be even higher, as part of the 
supernonneutrality argument.)   
 
 The gains in output must be ephemeral but the costs of the steady higher rate of inflation will be formidable. 
No solid economic theory underpins the short run ‘gains’ said to be associated with ‘sticky’ prices but the costs of the 
inflation have, in effect, already been examined in fact when we examined Friedman’s optimum money supply 
policies.  
 
 Friedman’s optimum money supply policy involved  Banks undertaking rates of change in R which  moved 
the economy from steady states of zero inflation to those with negative inflation. The gain is simply the capture of the 
general Marshallian surplus under the demand function for real R balances summing from the point where the net 
marginal physical product of such balances was positive to the point where the net product was zero. The essence of 
the problem and the great power of Friedman’s position is now clear.  
 
 The Marshallian surpluses are finite and it would appear that the costs of not adapting the Friedman rule 
would also be finite. A moment’s thought, however, shows otherwise. In setting out the optimum money supply 
policy the calculations must involve the present value of such Marshallian surpluses. In growing economies, these 
surpluses will be growing at the real rate  of growth of the economy, n + n’ and to calculate the present value of the 
stream of such surpluses, we must discount at the going real rate of return or real rate of interest, i|. Intertemporal 
economic theory will tell us that, in general, i| will exceed  n + n’ by the rate of time preference, rho. Designate the 
initial Marshallian surplus, MS. The present value of the stream of such surpluses will be then MS (1 + n + n’)/(i| - [n 
+ n’]) and if i| is rho + n + n’, we have a present value of MS (1+ n + n’)/rho. Now rho is a measure of the rate at 
which present generations discount the future. One can argue that  Bank policy should be distributionally neutral so 
that if the Bank takes that into account, it can be argued that the present value in terms of the economic welfare of 
today generation and all future generations of the adoption by the Bank of the Friedman  Rule approaches infinity, 
since the appropriate i| in this case would be approaching n + n’ as rho approaches zero. If the adoption of the rule by 
the Bank should involve some short run distress to today’s generation, never mind, the gain from adopting the 
Friedman rule is so great for all generations it will swamp all short run losses.  
 
 We set out this discussion in terms of moving from a rate of inflation of zero to the Friedman rate of -i|. If we 
started from a world of positive inflation, then we need not concern ourselves particularly with the Friedman  rule.  A 
monetary policy of reducing the inflation rate from p >0 to p = 0 would involve the possibility of extremely large 
gains in welfare, the calculations carried out in the manner just described, regardless of the short run consequences. 
 
 The extremely high costs of inflation associated with the existence of fiat money vanish once the fiat 
money stock vanishes.  
 
 All kinds of arguments then come to the fore to establish costs of even low rates of inflation. References are 
paid to the effects of inflation on welfare when the interaction of inflation and the tax and accounting systems are 
taken into account. The failure of tax systems to be more inflation indexed then they are and for accounting systems to 
be on current  value terms is an excellent indicator, however, that moderate rates of inflation do NOT involve great 
costs, at least none as great as those believed to be involved with costless fiat money and Friedman’s rule. Banks and 
economists have been forced to adopt all kinds of non-fundamental  theories of institutions of monetary economies to 
suggest significant costs of inflation.   
 
 Many such stories can be told. In the case of unexpected inflation people get confused between the 
movement of real relative prices and the movement of absolute or nominal prices. For example, if w (the rate of 
change of money wage rates) = k >0 or <0 and p, the rate of change of consumer prices, p = k>0 or <0, then, if I focus 
on w and w*, I would say that since wages are rising [falling] and are expected to rise [fall], workers are better 
[worse] off from ‘year’ to’ year’, while if I focus on p, I would say that they are getting worse off, if p* >0 [better off 
if p*<0], while it is clear that since w* = p*, real wages are remaining unchanged and workers are no better nor no 
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worse off ‘year’ to ‘year.’ Yet, if inflation or deflation misleads people so that, not possessed as they will be by the 
complete knowledge of all w’s and p*’s, moving alike,.they will make costly decisions, working harder [or less hard] 
when they think erroneously that wages are rising relative to prices, finding out they were wrong and then having to 
work harder [less hard]  to maintain their well being unchanged. Over all the cost of inflation [deflation] is that people 
will made unwise intertemporal decisions.[See Dodge (2003)] 
 
 Yet it is hard to believe that such costs could be very large since if they were it would pay both demanders 
and suppliers of labour to have wage rates and prices indexes. Indeed, at one time in the nineteenth century in Canada, 
wage rate indexes and price indexes were made available, at a price, to producers of goods and suppliers of labour 
from forerunners of  Statistics Canada. The  indexes were designed to prevent wage earners and producers from being 
prey to the unwise decisions making just outlined. With wage rate indexes, and even early versions of CPIs available, 
it is hard to see how individuals could fail to distinguish between movements in  absolute levels of the prices of labour 
and consumables and relative movements so that no confusion between absolute movements of money wages and  
‘real’ wages would necessarily be generated by inflation. Again, it seems that unless the costs of inflation are 
integrated within the confines of the absolute quantity theory of money they are hard to quantify and defend Yet as I 
have shown the costs of inflation within  the framework of the quantity theory of money can no longer be 
countenanced since there is no base on which to measure the costs of inflations or deflations. 
Consequence #3:  The Theoretical Reconsideration of Keynesian Economics
 
 The basic quantity theory of money says that variations in R should have no real effects (neutrality) but that 
variations in rates of growth of R can have real effects (supernonneutrality).  It would appear, moreover, that a given 
stock of fiat money plays an important real role, however,  in ensuring the existence of full employment. If the 
economy experiences  Keynesian unemployment, money wages and prices will fall until the real value of  fiat money 
brings about such wealth levels so that  consumption demand would return to the full employment level, even if 
investment demand had shrunk to zero. The basic argument is that Keynes was theoretically mistaken when he argued 
in his GENERAL THEORY that full employment was not necessarily the equilibrium outcome of modern 
competitive enterprise economies. This refutation of Keynesian economics is now standard fare in economics. 
 
 Two comments represent a widely held view that Keynes was guilty of fundamental theoretical error. 
         
But in this [THE GENERAL THEORY] admirable attempt at formal theory, Keynes failed. His top-
priority goal of articulating a model with an unemployment equilibrium......foundered on the Pigou-Patinkin 
real balance effect.[McCallum, 1987, 125} 
 
 It is sometimes argued against Pigou-Patinkin real balance effects  that falling prices will create instability because 
of exacerbated Fisherian debt-deflation effects, excess demand for money because nominal interest rates cannot go negative 
and consequently even greater falls in prices, in short, price and output instability. However, Friedman provides a powerful 
answer.[Friedman, 1976] He distinguishes between output and real private income, out of which expenditure on output 
takes place. Private real income is output plus (minus) real capital gains (losses) from holding outside fiat money, with 
debt-deflation effects distributionally offsetting. The faster prices fall the greater is real private income and the greater are 
expenditures on output. In the case of no investment,  real private income, by Friedman's dynamic version of the real 
balance effect, would be greater the greater the fall in prices and real consumption expenditure would approach the full 
employment level of output. At that point prices and money wages would stop falling, Keynesian unemployment is 
eliminated and the Fisher-Tobin spectre of nominal and real instability set aside. 
 
 Keynes knew of the Pigou effect and dismissed it as empirically unimportant.8 So do Friedman and McCallum.9  
Here is a scholastic curiosity.(Coates, 1996). While it is stated that one would not rely upon 'real balance' effects in the real 
world, they nevertheless prove that Keynes's contention that there may exist a less than full employment equilibrium is said 
to be without theoretical foundation. As Friedman (1976, 321) says,  
 
"The Pigovian and the [Friedman's] more far-reaching answer to Keynes's proposition have been extremely 
important on a theoretical level in assuring that there is no basic flaw in our theoretical analysis. But I hasten to 
add that in my opinion neither corresponds to effects that are empirically important in the kind of economic 
fluctuations that actual economies experience."  
 
 Without a fiat money base, these arguments against Keynes’s theory completely collapse.  [Rogers and 
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Rymes,2001]. 
 
Bank of Canada Policy: A Brief Keynesian Critique 
 
 Not only has R, the stock of costless fiat money, lost its role, by its departure, in determining the level of prices, P, 
but rates of change in it have lost their roles of determining p. Inflation is everywhere no longer a monetary phenomenon in 
the traditional sense as being due to changes in R. 
 
 Without R, the consequence is that price levels, the Ps, and rates of change in them, the ps, are indeterminate and 
there is no guarantee that competitive free enterprise economies will equilibrate  at full employment. The Keynesian spectre 
reappears. We now live in a world in which P and p, determined long ago by H, are now indeterminate. However, we can 
set out the time in history (July 1994) in which H played its curtain call and argue that P and p since then are determined 
both by history and subsequent aggregate demands and  supples as partly determined by the Bank.  
 
 From July 1994 on, then the Bank determined P and p by the setting of the bands.. Competitive bank behaviour 
will lead the overnight or money market rate to be half way between the bands, as we have already seen. Suppose then in 
July 1994, the price level was P and its rate of change p. Assume the best case so that the setting of the band spread can 
preserve price stability. 
 
 As we have also seen, the basic argument behind the Bank’s policy must be the Marshall-Wicksell position that 
there is a real or natural rate of interest, i|, and a money or market rate of interest, i,  such that i = i| + p* and in equilibrium i 
= i| + p. Suppose  such an equilibrium exits with p = p* >0 and the Bank wishes to rid the system of any inflation. If i|  is 
taken as given independent of monetary policy, then if the Bank sets i higher than i| + p* (=p), then the level of economic 
activity would fall below that maintaining the p* (=p). A lower p and p* would come into play until p* and p would equal 
0. If the initial equilibrium had a p = p* <0, then the Bank would have to set an i sufficiently low such that the level of 
economic activity would rise above that associated with the low, even a negative rate of inflation, such that p and p[* would 
become equal. The Bank would be so obliged because of its argument that rates of change of prices which are negative are 
equally costly as those which are positive.  
 
 The implication of the argument is, however, destructive of the Bank’s basic position that its policy has no real 
long run effects. The Bank cannot affect the level of economic activity and the rate of inflation through manipulation of 
nominal or market rates of interest without having permanent effect on real rates of interest.    
   
 Suppose, for example, the expected rate of inflation moves up from zero to some positive figure because expected 
real rates of return are higher. The higher rates of return cause banks to expand overdrafts and  deposits, implying that 
aggregate demand will rise, and note that the expansion is Wicksellian-Keynesian without the limitation of reserves because 
of their now non-existence so that prices begin to rise10. The Bank will raise, by the bands device, short term rates of  
interest such that, assuming that banks, borrowers and depositors and the banking system, are competitive, nominal rates of 
interest must rise by more than the increase in real rates and the expected rates of inflation. This means that levels of 
investment will cease to grow as rapidly as before and the real rates of growth of the economy will sag, causing reductions 
in real rates of return or real rates of interest. The reverse argument holds if the initial equilibrium is disturbed by a decrease 
in the expected real rates of interest.  The Bank must lower the bands so preventing the losses in output, investment and 
growth which would otherwise occur. Unlike the situation where there was an existent stock of  nominal fiat  money, the 
control over the set of changes of nominal magnitudes is entirely in the Banks hands, and in carrying out its policy, it is 
always operating on rates of accumulation, consequently on rates of growth of output and real rates of interest and return. 
 
 Yet one would ask for a distinction between overnight or short run money and real rates of interest and long run 
rates. The Bank would argue, while admitting the disappearance of any neutrality propositions in monetary theory,  that 
there are real variables which can be take as given independent of monetary policy.. The Bank may well argue that when it 
moves  overnight rates though it may affect short run real rates of return, it cannot affect long run real rates. Thus, in 
opposition to what I am arguing, the Bank may say we recognize that short run real effects will occur but long run real rates 
of interest and return, based as they are on long run rates of accumulation and growth are still impervious to monetary 
policy. The Keynesian liquidity connection between short and long run rates of return sets this contention aside. If long 
rates are normally higher than short rates by liquidity premiums, then continued up and down operation on short rates by 
the Bank must affect the differences in liquidity between short and long rates. Such differences always involve the Bank 
operating, if indirectly, on long rates. 
 
7
  
Conclusion
 
 The brief but old Keynesian story with which we conclude our study, a study which hints at how Keynes reappears 
on the stage as one of the leading actors in twenty first century monetary theory stage, must be extended to the modern 
theory of banking and the role banks play in determining through their effects on transactions technologies not only on real 
global consequences such as the overall levels of output but their effects on relative prices. This must be done in order to 
complete the task which Keynes set himself in the GENERAL THEORY, that of producing a monetary theory of value. 
This is one of the exciting theoretical tasks confronting us as we work with a revitalised  Keynesian economics. [For 
examples, see Rogers and Rymes (1997, 1999) and Rymes (1999).  
 
 One thing can be said with certainty. In the last decade  of the twentieth century, we have witnessed the death of 
the quantity theory of money and all the monetary consequences said to follow from such theory. Notable actors indeed 
have indeed been banished, both by theoretical developments and their real empirical counterparts, from the monetary 
stage. May flights of angels ..... 
 
          
 
Appendix: Sidebar on C 
 
 It is still the case that the Bank carries as part of its liabilities the notes it issues. The Bank still argues that it 
affects the economic system by operating on monetary components of its balance sheet, the liabilities of interest, ignoring 
government deposits with it, being its note issue and traditional reserve deposits of banks. The argument of this paper is that 
reserves have vanished and the note issue would best be returned to private banks. My basic point is that the Bank’s special 
balance sheet has evaporated  (I ignore obvious entries such as  the Bank’s capital equipment) yet effective monetary policy 
remains intact. Thus, whereas high powered money H  used to be C + R, where C was bank notes circulating in the hands of 
the general nonbank public and R were the net positive settlement balances held by banks with the Bank, it would now 
appear that H is just C and nothing else. However, even when the sum C + R had its traditional meaning, it was the case 
that C was determined by public demand and R was determined by Bank supply, clearly the fundamental reason why H 
should never be treated as homogeneous in any sense. The stock of C was determined by the general public, as it should be 
in modern economies, and changes in it were not part of central bank policy as usually defined.  Indeed, it would be more 
useful theoretically to conceive of C as privately produced, somewhat akin to the production of coins by the Royal 
Canadian Mint, a profit-making though government enterprise, by private banks with Central Bank notes therefore not 
appearing at all as part of H. Indeed, the appropriate model is to set H equal to zero and to see what Bank of Canada policy 
must now be. 
  
  The Bank’s position as monopoly  issuer of C is not required for policy purposes. The note issue in Canada should 
be returned to private banks as should the coin issue be returned to private mints, such as the Royal Canadian Mint, now a 
profit seeking crown corporation in Canada. Why? 
 
 The Bank of Canada has not done a good job defending the currency against counterfeiting, as witnessed by the 
fact that $100 and $50 notes are now almost entirely out of effective circulation. It will be interesting to note how 
successful the Bank will be in recapturing the public’s confidence with its new $100 note. The selection of the 
denomination of the notes and coins is in disarray in Canada. For example, twenty five dollar notes were originally 
commemorative issues celebrating the reign of George V with no thought being given, so far as I know, of that 
denomination being continued in active use. In Canada we had at one time one, two, five, ten, twenty, fifty, one hundred, 
and one thousand dollar notes in circulation, with ten thousand dollar notes functioning at one time as ‘bank legals’. The 
coins were pennies or coppers [one cent], nickels [five cents], dimes [ten cents], quarters [twenty five cents], fifty cent 
coins (with no attempt being made to encourage the active use of them) and one dollar coins were essentially 
commemorative pieces. There was, so far as I know,  no attempt to relate the bill and coin denominations, such as is 
implied by the  decimal or even the duodecimal denominational systems. In recent years, the one and two dollar notes are 
no longer issued by the Bank and are now issued as coins by the Mint. The Bank always stood ready to buy back from the 
banks surplus notes, paying for them with additions to reserves deposits. I understand the Mint, however, is under no 
obligation to repurchase surplus coins from the banks, behaviour which no doubt, reduces the effectiveness of coin 
transactions technologies used in Canada. The Bank would argue that the monopoly issue of notes and coins provides the 
Government of Canada with seigniorage. It is not at all clear, however, once costs of issue and maintenance of an issue 
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such as enforcement against counterfeiting, are taken into account, that seigniorage is necessarily positive. The costs of the 
penny dictate its demonetization and it is astonishing that the penny still is part of ‘coin of the realm’. The Bank in an 
attempt to make underground economic activities more expensive no longer issues $1000 notes. In any event, one good 
thing about the basic theory of the optimum money supply policies is that it effectively destroys the argument for 
seigniorage, it being shown to be an inefficient mode of Government taxation. 
 
 If private banks produced circulating notes, the Bank of Canada would purchase them in the event of monetary 
crises, exercising its lender of last resort capacities, offering deposits with it in exchange for the bank notes charging  the 
usual Bagehot prices or ‘service charges’, so encouraging the banks to be careful to preserve confidence in their note issues 
and private transactors to get out of Bank positions as soon as possible.  
 
References 
 
Baltensberger, E. (1980) “Alternative approaches to the theory of the banking firm”, Journal of Monetary Economics, VI, 
January, 1-37. 
Bank of Canada (1991), The Implementation of Monetary Policy in a System with Zero Reserve Requirements, Discussion 
Paper #3, revised September. 
---------------------(1996) A Proposed Framework for the Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Large Value Transfer 
System Environment”, Discussion Paper # 2, 1 March. 
 
Blinder, A(1988) Central Banking in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: MIT Press) 
--------------(1994) “On sticky prices: academic theories meet the real world”, ed. N. G. Mankiw, Monetary Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 
Clinton, K. (1997) Implementation of Monetary Policy in a Regime with Zero Reserve Requirements 
Working Paper #97-8, April 
Coates, J. (1996) The Claims of Common Sense: Moore, Wittgenstein, Keynes and the social sciences. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press)  
Dimand, R. (1991), "Keynes, Kalecki, Ricardian equivalence, and the real balance effect", Bulletin of Economic Research, 
XLIII, July, 289-292. 
Dodge, D. (2003), “Low and Predictable Inflation and the Performance of Canadian Labour Markets”, Lecture to 
Memorial University, 20 November. 
Friedman, M (1960), A Program for Monetary Stability (New York: Fordham University Press) 
----------------- (1976) Price Theory (Chicago: Aldine) 
Galbraith, J. A. and Rymes, T.K.(1990), “Privatizing the Monetary Base Without Giving Up Monetary Control", 
Canadian Economics Association, Victoria, 01 June 1990, Carleton Economic Papers, 1990 
Goodhart, C. (1995), “Money supply control: Base or interest rates?”, eds. Hoover, K. and Sheffrin, S. Monetarism and the 
Methodology of Economics (Aldershot: Edward Elgar) 
Laidler, D. (1991),  THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE QUANTITY THEORY : The Development of 
                Neoclassical Monetary Economics 1870-1914. New York; Toronto : P. Allan.  
-------------- (1990), “The ‘buffer stock’ notion in monetary economics”, in his Taking Money Seriously and Other Essays,  
(New York: Philip Allan). 
-------------- (2003), “Monetary policy without money: Hamlet without the Ghost”, Festschrift in Honour of Chuck 
Freedman, Bank of Canada , Ottawa.  
Longworth, D. (2003) , “Money in the Bank (of Canada)”, Bank of Canada Technical Report # 93,  February. 
--------------------2004), “The interaction between monetary and financial stability policies”, Remarks before the Economic 
Club of  Toronto, 9 January. 
McCallum, B. (1987), "The development of Keynesian macroeconomics",  American Economic Review, May 1987, 
reprinted in Boris D. Pesek, Microeconomics of Money and Banking and Other Essays (Hemel Hampstead: Harvester-
Wheatsheaf). 
McCallum, B. (1989)  MONETARY ECONOMICS: Theory and Policy 
Milbourne, R. (1988), “Disequilibrium buffer stock models: a survey”, Journal of Economic Surveys, II, 187-208. 
Palley, T. Post Keynesian Economics: Debt, Distribution and the Macroeconomy (London: Macmillan) 
Rogers, Colin and rymes, T. K. (1997) “Keynes'  monetary theory of value and modern  banking",  eds G. 
Harcourt and P. Riach,  A ‘SECOND EDITION’ OF THE GENERAL THEORY, I (London: Routledge). 
------------------------------------------ (1999) "The disappearance of Keynes’s nascent theory of banking between the 
TREATISE and THE GENERAL THEORY”, ed J. Smithin, What is Money? (London: Routlege)  
 
9
------------------------------------------ (2001) ”On 'money' in IS-LM and AD/AS models", eds Warren Young and Ben 
Zion Zilberfarb, IS-LM and  Modern macroeconomics (Boston: Kluwer). 
Rymes, T. K.(1989), "The theory and the measurement of the nominal output of banks, sectoral rates of saving 
and wealth in the National Accounts", eds. Robert E. Lipsey and Helen Stone Tice, The Measurement of Saving, 
Investment, and Wealth (Chicago, University of Chicago Press for the NBER, 1989). 
------------------(1971), Logical impossibility of optimum money supply policies, Carleton Economic Papers. 
------------------(1998) "Keynes and anchorless banking",  Journal of the History of Economic Thought, XX, 
Number 1, 71-82. 
----------------- (1999) “Effects of monetary policy on productivity in Canada.”, Carleton Economic Papers, 1999 in  
Statistics Canada, Probing the New Economic Realities, publication on Statistics Canada’s 0.website of the 
proceedings of a conference in Ottawa, 23-24 March 1999. 
Woodford, M. (1990), "The optimum quantity of money", eds. Benjamin Friedman and Frank H, Hahn, Handbook of 
Monetary Economics, II, (Amsterdam: North-Holland).  
 
                                                          
1 This paper is part of my collaboration with Colin Rogers on the study of Keynesian monetary value theory. He is as yet 
not to be held responsible for any of its content. 
2 One of the best historical accounts of the quantity theory of money is Laidler, (1988). .Evidence that Professor Laidler still 
adheres to the quantity theory of money is found in Laidler (2003 ). For similar views, see Longworth (2003).  
3 There is a puzzle why banks in Canada at the system level actually hold small positive settlement  balances (hereafter sbs) 
with the Bank, even though theoretically they should be zero. Apparently banks find operating zero sbs costly and the Bank 
offers them compensation in the formal +ve sbs. Though I have been offered explanations by officers of the Bank as to why 
this is so, I confess I cannot understand their arguments. I  shall assume throughout this paper that in equilibrium banks at 
the system level have no reserves whatsoever with the Bank of Canada. At any and probably at all times individual banks 
carry +ve or -ve sbs with the Bank, whereas for all banks the sum of the +ve and -ve sbs equals zero.  
 
4 If the bank thought to decrease its money market holdings then its revenues are down by i but because its expected 
negative settlement balances with the bank are down by i so that half the time it expects its costs to be down by i while its 
expected positive settlement balances are up so that half the time, its expected costs in this sense are down by i so that with 
marginal revenues and costs both down by i, there is no incentive for the bank to alter its portfolio.   
5 It is understood that it is the reserves of banks, as the principal component of fiat money, which are currently being 
addressed. Since banks were required under ancien reserves regimes to carry non optimum stocks of them, then the general 
public will, it can be shown, also hold non-optimum amounts of real overdrafts, loans and deposits. See Rymes (1989) 
6 If the Bank should acquiesce and allow its policy of reducing the rate of growth of the money supply to be set aside, then 
the whole Friedman argument would seem to collapse. That “...the money supply is endogenously determined.” is 
sometimes said to be “The theoretical claim [which] represents the major innovation and cornerstone of Post-Keynesian 
monetary theory.” (Palley, 1996, 13). We can see how easily that claim can be set aside in this case. Indeed, it is in general 
not a serious claim. The Bank engages in a contraction of the money supply by reducing the rate of growth of reserves as 
positive settlement balances of the banks with it. People expect prices to fall and try to hold more money to capture the 
capital gains. If people try to hold more Bank notes, it will certainly so oblige but that would cause the reserves of the banks 
to tighten even more, which would cause the banks to pay more interest on deposits, a process which would reduce the 
demand for goods and increase the demand for bank deposits, causing there to be the required once-over reduction in 
prices. So long as the Bank holds firm, the Friedman argument for the existence of an optimum money supply policy 
appears secure and the emphasis in the post-Keynesian literature on the endogeneity of the money supply unhelpful. This is 
true even though we have shown and argued in general it would be perfectly possible for the community as a whole to wish 
to hold more Bank notes and for the Bank to agree without in any way undermining its basic policy of so controlling the 
rate of growth of reserves to bring about the desired  negative inflation rate  equal to the going real rate of return as part of 
the optimum money supply policy.   
7  For arguments that there are logical problems with continuous lumpsum taxes transfers in the context of the optimum 
monetary neoclassical growth models, see Woodford and also Rymes, (1972). 
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8 Keynes thought the Pigou-Kalecki effect was "...too fantastic for words". (Dimand, 1991). 
9  Friedman, op. cit. and McCallum, (1989). McCallum's views about the empirical unimportance of the real balance effect 
are drawn up in the context of evaluating the welfare costs of steady inflation. The basic conclusion in his summary 
analytical framework, which must follow from the assumed presence of nominal anchors and the belief that policy is 
concerned with the manipulation of such costless fiat creatures, is that most macroeconomists accept as a theoretical 
principle that deviations of output or employment "...cannot be affected permanently by monetary policy."(216). 
10 It is here assumed that rates of savings will not become immediately higher, obviating the requirement that some non-
inflationary activity by the Bank will be necessary. If there was an equilibration increase in thriftiness, the upward pressure 
on prices would be reduced and  real i| and nominal rates i would essentially remain unchanged. 
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